

The tripartite matrix, the basic assumption of Incohesion and Scapegoating in Foulkesian Group Analysis: Clinical and empirical illustrations, including terrorism and terrorists

La Matriz Tripartita, La Asunción Básica de No Cohesión y el Chivo Emisario en el Grupoanálisis Foulkesiano: Ilustraciones Clínicas y Empíricas, incluidos Terrorismo y Terroristas



Earl Hopper (UK)

Earl Hopper, Ph.D. is a psychoanalyst, group analyst and organizational consultant in private practice in London. A Distinguished Fellow of the American Group Psychotherapy Association, and an Honorary Member of the Group Analytic Society International, he is a former President of the International Association for Group Psychotherapy and Group Processes (IAGP). He is the Editor of the New International Library of Group Analysis.

earl@drhopper.co.uk

Abstract

An outline of the group analytic theory of the tripartite matrix, and a reconsideration of the dynamics of trauma, the fear of annihilation, helplessness, and envy, enables the theorisation of a fourth basic assumption in the unconscious life of groups and group-like social systems, which I have called Incohesion: Aggregation/Massification or (ba) I:A/M. Scapegoating processes are the main pillar of massification.

An understanding of the personification of Incohesion has important clinical and empirical implications, especially for the treatment of our most difficult traumatised patients.

This can be seen in the traumatogenic processes of terrorism and terrorists which can be understood in terms of Winnicott's work on the anti-social tendency and Foulkes' work on autistic communicational gestures.

The failure of the deepest desire for communication concerning the experience of trauma leads to the collapse of hope and the perversion of the golden rule: do unto others as you believe that you have been done by.

Resumen

Un esbozo de la teoría Grupoanalítica de la matriz tripartita, y una reconsideración de la dinámica del trauma, el miedo a la aniquilación, la impotencia y la envidia, permiten la teorización de una cuarta asunción básica en la vida inconsciente de grupos y sistemas sociales similares a grupos, que he llamado Agregación de Incoherencia: /Masificación o (ba) I: A/M. Los procesos de chivo expiatorio son el pilar principal de la masificación.

La comprensión de la personificación de la Incohesión tiene importantes implicaciones clínicas y empíricas, especialmente para el tratamiento de nuestros pacientes traumatizados más difíciles.

Esto se puede ver en los procesos traumatogénicos del terrorismo y los terroristas, que pueden entenderse como la tendencia antisocial en términos del trabajo de Winnicott y como gestos comunicativos autistas según el trabajo de Foulkes.

El fracaso del deseo más profundo de comunicación sobre la experiencia del trauma conduce al colapso de la esperanza y a la perversión de la regla de oro: haz a los demás lo que crees que se te ha hecho.

In this article I will outline some of the defining features of Foulkesian Group Analysis with particular reference to the theory and concept of the tripartite matrix, and to what I have termed Incohesion: Aggregation/Massification as the fourth basic assumption in the unconscious life of groups and group-like social systems or (ba) I:A/M. I will illustrate this orientation and theory with data from my twice weekly groups, the details of which have been changed in order to protect the confidentiality of the members of the groups, and with data from consultations and demonstrations. I will also provide examples from my longstanding study of terrorism and terrorists of various kinds. Unfortunately, in order to limit the length of this article, I will not be able to explore my counter-transference processes. The Reader must decide whether this article is primarily about Group Analysis, Incohesion, and Scapegoating, or primarily about terrorism and terrorists. I would suggest that this is really a matter of focus and interest. (My psychoanalyst used to say that psychoanalysis was not only impossible, but also very difficult; this surely applies to Group Analysis, perhaps even more so).

PART ONE: THE TRIPARTITE MATRIX IN FOULKESIAN GROUP ANALYSIS ¹

I - The Realms and Dimensions of the Tripartite Matrix

1. In Group Analysis (in contradistinction to what is known in the United States as the “Tavi” orientation, with its emphasis on the work of Melanie Klein, Wilfred Bion and Henry Ezriel, and on “the group as-a-whole” in the “Here and Now”; and perhaps in contradistinction to what is known as “psychoanalytical group therapy”, with virtually no emphasis on the group-as-a-whole), the focus is on human beings/persons in the context of their groups, which are regarded as dynamic open social systems, and analysed in terms of the tripartite matrix, consisting of the foundation matrix of the contextual society, the dynamic matrix of the particular group, and the personal/organismic matrices of the participants in it. Although it is important to consider the possibility of a cosmic matrix, I am uncertain if this should be a matrix in its own right or a component of the organismic part of the personal matrix, or if a cosmic matrix is “merely” omnipresent.

Dynamic and foundational matrices are manifest in their patterns of interaction (interpersonal relationships), patterns of normation (values, norms and beliefs), patterns of communication (verbal and non-verbal), styles of thinking and feeling, and so on. Although the study of patterns of technology has been neglected by group analysts, they are an important dimension of each realm of the tripartite matrix. For example, patterns of technology shape interpersonal relations, influence values and norms, and affect the curves of “effective intelligence” in the population as-a-whole. Although personal matrices are manifest in relational processes, intra-psychic life must be described in terms of the theory and concepts of various depth psychologies, e.g. unconscious fantasy, phases of development, psychic structures, etc.

The tripartite matrix offers not only a way of perceiving society, community, family, and person/organism, but also a way of thinking about them. All groups are microcosms of their contextual society and its many organisations and institutions.

2. Events and processes in the foundation matrix are recapitulated in the dynamic matrix of a group and in the personal matrices of the members of it, and to some degree vice versa. Based on our understanding of the group as a dynamic open social system, group analysts refer to the possible “equivalence” of the processes and events in various matrices. Equivalence is driven by the need to defend against psychic pain. On the basis of the dis-associative defences of denial and disavowal, what cannot be experienced and considered in a particular

time and space, or in other words within a particular matrix, is enacted unconsciously within another time and space, or in other words within another matrix, in which it is thought that the narratives of these experiences are more likely to be heard and to be heard safely. (In the United States, colleagues refer in this regard to “parallel processes”; in systems centred approaches to therapy, colleagues refer to processes/events in the group which are thought to be isomorphic with processes/events in a hierarchy of sub-systems which ultimately may be contextual (Gantt & Hopper, 2012)).

These equivalent (or parallel or isomorphic) enactments within the tripartite matrix are expressed through pathological projective and introjective identification and pathogenic mirroring, based on expulsion, sadism, control of the object, turning passive into active, and attempting to communicate that which cannot easily and readily be put into words. This is especially relevant for working with traumatic experience in which there is a desperate urge to communicate the stubbornly sub-symbolic elements of psychic life (Grossmark, 2017).

II - Clinical Illustrations

1. An example of equivalence that was not enacted can be seen in the communications in one of my slow-open heterogenous groups, which includes one member who was in training as a group analyst, and which met twice weekly for the purpose of psychotherapy:

During a week in which there was an outbreak of anti-Semitic behaviour in many parts of London, as seen in graffiti and the defacement of tomb stones in two Jewish cemeteries, a discussion ensued about anxieties about living in a de facto ghetto, i.e., a feature of the foundation matrix of the society. The patient who was in training as a group analyst spoke about her anxieties concerning the development of an elitist and mostly Jewish sub-group within the training organisation, i.e. a feature of the dynamic matrix of an important contextual organisation. Another member of the group tearfully recalled traumatic experience that she had more or less encapsulated since she was a child, i.e. a feature of her personal matrix. At the next session a patient started the group by saying that she had discovered a lump in her breast, which she assumed was a cyst, i.e. a feature of her personal/organismic matrix, and that she had arranged to have this investigated.

2. In clinical work what is taken up for further exploration is always a matter of judgement, perhaps more of an art form than a matter of technique. We try to go where it is “hottest”, which is based on an appreciation of the need to work with transference and

countertransference processes, especially with respect to all parts of the Oedipus complex. In the context of groups, such processes must be understood in both their vertical T and vertical CT-forms directed towards the conductor of the group, and in their horizontal t and horizontal ct-forms directed towards the members of the group. These processes are almost always interrelated. Moreover, we do not think about transference and countertransference processes only in terms of the repetition in the “Here and Now” of the “Here and Then”, but also in terms of the repetition of the “There and Then” and the “There and Now”. We are attentive to the dynamics of each cell in the time-space paradigm, which includes transgenerational and epigenetic processes within the foundation matrix of the contextual society. Hence our appreciation of what in Groups Analysis is called the “social unconscious”, which goes beyond an emphasis on the sociality of human nature and pertains to the mentality of the group of which its members are unconscious (Hopper, 2003a; Hopper & Weinberg, 2011, 2016, 2017).

The details of the following clinical vignette are especially apposite:

I brought a new patient into a longstanding twice weekly slow-open heterogeneous group. She was the eighth member of the group, and filled a vacancy left by a man who had been in the group for five years. The new patient was thirty-five years of age, a psychiatrist, and a very dark-skinned Sri-Lankan who had come to London with her parents when she was about three years of age. Although she wore Western style clothes, she also wore a lot of jewellery, such as earrings and necklaces, made of chunky gold. She was treated somewhat contemptuously in the group, being teased as someone who could not quite make up her mind as to whether she wanted to be a modern Western woman or a traditional Indian woman. Two members of the group insisted on using “Ceylon” rather than Sri Lanka. The women in the group expressed their envy of her “interesting” and “exotic” style. A man in the group welcomed her as “bringing something different to the party”. Another man said that he was somewhat “frightened” by her “fully dressed” severity. During the eighth session following her joining the group, a woman said that the group reminded her of what it was like in her own family after the birth of her younger brother who was deemed to be a new Prince who could do no wrong, and was regarded by her mother as having brought new gifts to the family. At the end of the session, the group left the room as usual, but the new patient remained in the foyer. She knocked on the door of my consulting room and reported that someone had “by mistake” taken her

black rubber raincoat from the “coat peg”, and that to her annoyance she would now be without protection from the rain on her way home.

At the next session, the woman who had taken the coat in error returned it to her and apologised for this. She acknowledged that within a few minutes of leaving the premises, she had become aware that she had taken the coat entirely by “accident”. She had also become aware that the patient would be exposed to the rain, whereas she herself would be protected by the raincoat. This event was then discussed and explored at some length, often in a very heated way.

Eventually I suggested that the new patient was experienced as a chosen little brother who was much loved by me, and that in the Jewish religion the eighth session was equivalent to the day for the ritual circumcision of a boy. The raincoat was regarded unconsciously as foreskin. Obviously, “he” had to be circumcised.

A member of the group said that the new patient was arrogant, as many Jews are, implying that she seemed to think that she had no need for protection and safety as “ordinary” people did. She seemed to regard herself as special, from the “East”, so to say. The group discussed whether one had to be a Jew in order to be regarded as a Jew, and whether one had to be a male in order to be regarded as a male. The new patient said that in truth she was not afraid of a little moisture. Her life was in any case always one of tears.

The atmosphere of the group began to change. The group began to talk about mourning and reparation.

Bringing a new member into a group usually arouses feelings of anxious resentment. In order to understand these feelings, it is necessary to appreciate the dynamics of sibling relations involving envy, competition and rivalry, primarily in terms of the dynamic matrix of the group and the personal matrices of its members. Today, however, in the UK and elsewhere in Europe, as well as in the United States, it is also important to consider the dynamics of immigration and the predicament of refugees and their families within their wider contextual societies. It would be entirely relevant to explore feelings about President Trump and his policies concerning the Wall between Mexico and the United States, the people who support him and those who despise him, racism, social and political exclusion and inclusion, etc. However, the “News” travels so quickly today that these

issues are also relevant to clinical work in other countries. Such processes involve many aspects of social identity.

**PART TWO: INCOHESION: AGGREGATION/
MASSIFICATION OR (BA) I:A/M AS A FOURTH BASIC
ASSUMPTION IN THE UNCONSCIOUS LIFE OF
GROUPS AND GROUP-LIKE SOCIAL SYSTEMS ²**

I - Basic assumption processes in general

Basic assumption processes are exceedingly complex. However, in order to discuss Incohesion it is necessary to make at least the following points about them:

1. All groups are characterised by their “work group” and by their “basic assumption group” (Bion, 1961). There are many kinds of work-group defined in terms of their conscious intention in order to do some work or to carry out what we call primary and secondary tasks. The reflective process within a group who meets for the purpose of psychotherapy for its members takes place within the work group, at least ideally. In practice, therapy and self-reflection take place within the context of basic assumption processes.

2. Basic assumptions are configurations of relational defences against various psychotic anxieties which arise as a function of the regression of groups and group-like social systems: Pairing as an expression of sexuality used as a defence against depressive position anxieties (Pairing can be “normal” or “perverse”, the latter based on the sexualisation of hatred); Fight/Flight as an expression of paranoid and persecutory anxieties associated with denigration as an expression of one part of envy; and Dependency as an expression of idealisation as a defence against the other part of envy. These basic assumptions have been discussed in terms of many different frames of reference, but this is how I have conceptualised them. At any given time, a basic assumption group is likely to be characterized by a particular basic assumption or combination of them.

3. Although they vary in their intensity, basic assumptions are ubiquitous and omnipresent. The metaphor of the work group floating like a cork on the Sea of Basic Assumptions is entirely apposite. Nonetheless, it is better for the three men in the tub to navigate rather than merely float, which implies that they think that they know where they are going. After all, basic assumptions can impede work as well as facilitate it. We are sometimes able to make creative use of psychotic anxieties and their expression in basic assumption processes.

4. All basic assumptions are associated with roles that are typical of each of them. People vary in their vulnerability to the suction power of these roles, their valence for enacting them, and/or their compulsion to personify them. Taking such roles supports the skins of identity that people in various states of regression need in order to survive the anxieties associated with regression. Whereas these personifications are usually discussed in terms of “leadership”, in fact “followership” is a better description of them. Real leadership is associated with work-group processes and the ability and willingness to take roles rather than to be sucked into the enactment of them.

5. Given the close connections of their genotypical structures with their underlying psychotic anxieties, basic assumptions can be understood in terms of the classical Jungian concept of the collective unconscious, which is species based and, therefore, universal. However, in their phenotypical manifestations, basic assumptions take on local colouration and expression, and, therefore, can also be understood in terms of the “social unconscious”. In other words, Fight/Flight in California looks rather different from Fight/Flight in the Middle East, although their underlying dynamics are the same.

II - Incohesion: Aggregation/Massification as a basic assumption

In this context I (Hopper, 2003b) have conceptualised the fourth basic assumption of Incohesion: Aggregation/Massification or (ba) I:A/M in terms of the following elements of it:

1. The traumatic experience of failed dependency based on inadequate containment and insufficient holding gives rise to the psychotic anxiety of the fear of annihilation. Trauma is more basic than envy. I regard envy as a defence against the profound helplessness that follows trauma, rather than as an expression of the death instinct. This orientation derives from a relational perspective rather than a drive centred, innatist perspective. (This orientation is associated with the work of the founders of the Group of Independent Psychoanalysts, associated with the British Psychoanalytical Society and with the work of Foulkes, and many of us associated with Group Analysis).

2. The fear of annihilation is characterised by psychic fission and fragmentation, followed by relational fusion and confusion with the object, and then by oscillation between these two states of mind. Although fusion and confusion with another person or a part of another person is the primary defence against the pains and anxieties of fission and fragmentation,

regression back into states of fission and fragmentation is the primary defence against the pains and anxieties associated with fusion and confusion. Such internal hell can only be controlled through the formation of intra-psychoic encapsulations and the development of either crustacean or amoeboid character structures.

3. Based on projective identification and introjective identification and other forms of externalisation and internalisation, psychic fission and fragmentation, and relational fusion and confusion are each manifest in Incohesion, the bi-polar states of which are “aggregation” and “massification”, which are equally incohesive. This can be seen in each and all the dimensions of the tripartite matrices of social systems. Aggregation is defined in terms of disintegration or unintegration in patterns of interaction; insolidarity or non-solidarity in patterns of normation; incoherence in patterns of communication; etc. Massification is defined in terms of pseudo-integration, pseudo-solidarity, and pseudo-coherence. However, the cohesion of a work group is defined in terms of the integration of patterns of interaction; the solidarity of patterns of normation; and the coherence of patterns of communication; etc. Metaphors for aggregation and massification might provide an intuitive sense of these properties of a group in a state of Incohesion: aggregation is like a handful of gravel, and massification is like a slice of basalt; aggregation is like a bucket of mussels, and massification is like a handful of wet sponges squeezed together; aggregation is like a bowl of boiled potatoes, and massification is like a bowl of mashed potatoes; aggregation is like a bowl of fried whitebait, and massification is like a piece of gefilte fish, etc.

4. Each component of an aggregate is the basis for the formation of a sub-group or a contra-group as well as of a micro-culture (de Maré, Piper & Thompson, 1991). Although these formations are typical of a large group, smaller groups can also aggregate. Sub-groups can be functional or dysfunctional for the group as-a-whole (Agazarian, 1997).

5. Stemming from intra-psychoic fission and fragmentation, intra-psychoic encapsulations, and subsequently from socio-cultural aggregation, some sub-groups and contra-groups or component aggregates are likely to become social psychic retreats, which can be positive or negative, and total or partial (Mojovic, 2011). Ghettos and enclaves are likely to emerge from such social psychic retreats.

6. As a function of equivalence, the constituent groupings of a social system characterised by Incohesion tend themselves to become incohesive, and to be in

states of either aggregation or massification. Whereas aggregated groupings are the location for competition and conflict rather than cooperation, massified groupings are like cults. Sub-groupings and contra-groupings can become fractals of their contextual social system, whether a society, an organisation or a group (Hopper, 2003b). They are like “plays within plays”.

7. The roles associated with aggregation include those of the “lone wolf” and of the “space cadet”; the roles associated with massification include those of “charismatic leadership” of both creative/reparative and destructive kinds, and those of the “cheerleader”. The people who take these roles tend to have a particular valence for them, to be vulnerable to being sucked into them, and to feel compelled to personify them, e.g. lone wolves and space cadets tend to be crustaceans; cheerleaders and charismatic leaders tend to be amoeboid narcissists. Many other roles are typical of Incohesion processes, and it is possible to trace the connections between the demands of such roles and the characteristics of people who are most vulnerable to their suction power.

III - A Clinical Illustration

Basic assumption processes can make clinical group work extremely challenging. However, basic assumption processes can also be extremely useful for the treatment of patients with particular problems. They are especially useful for the treatment of what we often call our most “difficult” patients, not only in terms of countertransference, but also in the sense that they have suffered the deepest traumatic experience. Having a valence for the roles associated with (ba) I:A/M, suffering a vulnerability for being sucked into them, and/or feeling driven to personify them, enables such a member of a group to become the focus of the group’s attention and activity. This enables a group to provide a highly traumatised patient with specific help and insight. This can be a matter of provoking a powerful enactment of unconscious traumatic experience coupled with a demand for attention (Billow, 2019).

The following clinical vignette is especially apposite:

After I informed the group that I would be taking a break for a couple of weeks, the group lapsed into a long silence marked by gaze avoidance. I commented on this aggregation a couple of times. This seemed to make matters worse, in that the silence became more pronounced and entrenched. The group seemed to be ignoring me. The silence was broken by a woman who talked about having been a victim of sexual abuse during her childhood by her older brother, who was her mother’s “favourite”.

Although this occurred about 45 years ago, she now wanted to take the matter to the police. The group enthusiastically supported her wish to do this, and railed against the abusive power of men who could never be trusted. The men in the group joined in this angry attack on unreliable men as though they were excluded from this category of people. I tried to connect this attack on men in general to attacks on fathers and on me.

Eventually I suggested that the group's total agreement seemed to have followed their experience of not being connected with one another. I asked whether this total and complete agreement was based on feeling that in the same way that the patient who reported that she had been abused by her brother had not been protected by her mother, the group had failed to protect her from me. The group asserted that after I had told them that I would be away, I commented that the patient had become sexually seductive in the group, and in saying this I had provoked unnecessary anxiety. The patient argued that the group could make up for their failure to protect her from me by punishing me for my insensitive and intrusive interpretation. Another member asserted that actually I was an abusive older brother, not merely an absent and unreliable father. I was not entitled to regard myself as a father. Yet another member of the group suggested that all this could be understood in terms of people feeling badly let down by our female Prime Minister and by the entire democratic political process. Although the process was driven by a patient with a history of abuse who also sought revenge, the issue of traumatic separation and failed dependency pertained not only to the group and to me, but also to England and to Europe as-a-whole and their elected leaders.

I said that it seemed to me that in the first instance I was experienced as an unreliable father in whose absence all this could happen. It was father's fault that mother could become so enmeshed with her son, and the son so enmeshed with his sister. However, it seemed to me that the group enacted several maternal functions in a massified way, and that the patient who had suffered sexual abuse when she was a child became a personifier of massification. She took on a figuration of the roles of plaintiff, lawyer, jury and judge, not only on her own behalf, but also on behalf of abused children everywhere. She was becoming a kind of cheerleader, which was not to suggest that sexual abuse was not a very serious matter and that this was just a matter of fantasy.

The politics of gender identity and ethnic identity were paramount. The group argued that women were entitled to speak up for themselves, and that powerful men had to be held to account. I asked the group who they were arguing with or against. Who might disagree with their point of view? One woman said "Harvey Weinstein would disagree". Another said that she thought that the "casting couch" could be found in the consulting rooms of training analysts who had power over students who were applying to train as analysts. A man pointed out that there was a couch in my consulting room too, and that there was some doubt whether I would support the application of a particular patient in the group who wanted to become a group analyst. I suggested that the group seemed to be making me into an immoral and evil obstacle to their own sense of goodness. I asked what was the meaning of bringing "Harvey Weinstein" into our discussions. Was he a father, a brother, or merely a man? I also asked the group whether they felt that the group experience was the "real deal" or merely a film.

This line of discussion continued for several sessions, and continued when I returned from the break. It stopped abruptly when it was reported in the press that Weinstein had a "heart attack", which I took up in terms of the group's fear that they might hurt me in their expressions of anger and disappointment. The woman who had been abused by her brother then wondered aloud if when I had been away I was consulting on a film, which she had heard is something that I often do. Another woman said with feeling that although we were in agreement that all men were bad, especially Jewish men, who, as is well known, were always their mothers' favourite children, it was absolutely time "to give it a rest", and get back to work. A man said that in his opinion, psychotherapy was not only a matter of recovering from the effects of trauma. Another man said that we were depriving ourselves from an opportunity to get something good from Hopper, who was not to blame for all the sins in the world.

Part Three: Scapegoating processes within the context of the basic assumption of Incohesion 3

In the context of Incohesion: Aggregation/Massification, the development and maintenance of massification depends on attempts by the members of the group to create a completely safe womb-like group, which requires the obliteration of all imperfections, followed by hallucinated attempts to merge with it, which requires the elimination of all obstacles to such merger. This also involves the elimination of the forbidding paternal object of boundary maintenance, rules and regulations, and the exercise of authority and power, which can be expressed through many forms of actual aggression and of actual violence, and in extreme cases through the destruction of people and property. As a defence against aggregation, massification is underpinned by two intertwined processes: fundamentalism and scapegoating. I will consider fundamentalism in a forthcoming publication, but I will now attempt to “unpack” scapegoating processes.

I - Scapegoating and Incohesion

1. Phenomena associated with unconscious shame and guilt are projected into particular people and sub-groups who are then banished from the group as-a-whole and deprived of the safety, support and nurture that are available to those who remain within it, and who take their identity from their membership of it. A victim of these projections can be considered as a “bizarre object” who introjectively identifies with a “splinter” or “shard” of the group. Such a victim becomes a scapegoat of the group, to use a biblical reference.

2. There are various kinds of scapegoating, but they are all characterized by sadomasochistic collusions between the perpetrators and victims of it. Scapegoats are “chosen people”: they are chosen to be banished. However, those who remain within the group are also “chosen people”: they are chosen by themselves as having the right to scapegoat. However, people who struggle with a sense of shame and guilt are likely to scapegoat themselves, which is a particular form of self-destructive collusion (Roth, 2010).

3. Scapegoating is a form of sacrifice, which involves expressions of both active and passive forms of love as well as of hate. Although the victims of sacrifice are objects of hate and sadism, acts of purification involve the submission of the self to the beloved collective. Gods are given only the best and most pure. For example, as reported in the Old Testament, Eleazar was instructed to procure for sacrifice a red

heifer which was unblemished by even one white hair.

The sacrifice of foodstuff involves the deepest forms and expressions of love and hate, as does eating itself. Although historically, the choice of objects for sacrifice has been sublimated and ritualized from people to animals to plants to idols to spirits, this transformation has proved to be impermanent. When a society has been traumatized, sublimations and rituals collapse. Words become things, and wishes become deeds.

4. Even one’s neighbour can become a scapegoat. The edict from Jesus to love one’s neighbour as oneself presents a particular ethical and political problem, because if one does not really love oneself, one cannot really love one’s neighbour, at least not very well. And if one hates oneself, one can only love one’s neighbour in a perverse way, based on sadism as the eroticisation of hatred. (In other words, perversion is rooted in what used to be called *secondary narcissism*, and secondary narcissism is rooted in traumatic experience). Social trauma is especially disturbing, because both one’s neighbour and oneself are likely to be damaged by it.

5. Based on stereotyping, scapegoating can be directed towards sub-groups and contra-groups as well as towards particular persons as representations of them. The projection of processes of envy, hatred and sadistic fantasies by one part of the group into another part of the group, with the aim of the annihilation of it, enables the “home” group to strengthen its identification as the idealised self-righteous group, and to neutralise any anti-group attitudes that might otherwise impair its own cohesion (Nitsun, 1996). Each sub-group of chosen people tends to be regarded by the others as arrogant, if not deluded, in their self-regard (Smith, 2003).

6. The internal Establishment within the mind of a person should be distinguished from the external Establishment in the external society (Hoggett, 1992). Of course, the internal representations of the external “Establishment” depend on both introjections and internal constructions. Although a designated sub-grouping or contra-grouping can become the scapegoat of the Establishment, the Establishment can become the scapegoat of a sub-grouping or contra-grouping. A macabre collective and self-destructive dance of death is likely to ensue between the Establishment and its scapegoat(s). However, this dance of death follows the so-called “music of the group”.

7. Scapegoating is often associated with the development and maintenance of social psychic retreats. Although these retreats can offer protection

against scapegoating by the Establishment, they can also contribute to it, because pressures towards massification within a retreat are very intense, and conformity and compliance breed stereotyping as a prelude to scapegoating.

In summary: scapegoating is not merely a matter of denying the existence of unwanted and unacceptable aspects of one's self or one's group and then projecting these phenomena into and onto other people and/or groups. It also involves, directly or indirectly, alone or with others, punitive attempts to exclude the recipient of these projections from the group, thereby depriving him of the general support that is available to the remaining members of the group, and exposing him to the vagaries of life as a non-member of it. These processes can apply to sub-groups and contra-groups as well as to persons, who are sometimes taken to be representative of them. Scapegoating is also associated with the sense of love and positive regard for the group as-a-whole, its core values, and its general identity in relationship to other groups. It involves sacrifice in which honour in the service of reparation is expressed towards a sacred being who is regarded as ultimately responsible for the well-being of the group. Thus, the unwanted and unacceptable aspects of one's self or one's group that have been denied and projected are regarded as sinful.

II - A Clinical Illustration of Scapegoating in the Context of Incohesion

In the context of all four of the cells in the time-space paradigm, those who have been scapegoated are vulnerable to being sucked into certain (ba) I:A/M roles within which they are likely to perpetuate the scapegoating process. An especially relevant example of such processes can be seen in the following vignette from one of my twice weekly slow-open heterogenous groups of eight patients, including three men and five women:

One of the men, who is a sociologist at a well-known university, was persistently attacked by the women. He was only rarely supported by the other two men, who tended to be rather silent and withdrawn. These attacks took the form of strongly expressed disagreements, contemptuous stares, making silent eye contact with the other women, and dramatic eye rolling. These attacks were precipitated by the young sociologist's interpretations of both contributions from other members of the group and various group processes in terms of psychoanalytical phases of development, ranging from Oedipal anxieties and relationships to psychotic anxieties and part-object relations, drawing on symbolism of a "Freudian" kind, mainly concerning bodily functions and sexuality in particular. He had not yet learned much

about group dynamics, and so we were spared references to basic assumptions and processes of equivalence.

Clearly, this patient was highly intelligent, but he was also very lonely. His behaviour was a way of protecting himself against the anxieties that were aroused by the expression of feeling or more precisely by the possibility that such feelings would be expressed. He had come into the group seeking help with his loneliness, general sense of meaninglessness, and inability to make friends, especially with women. He felt that these problems stemmed from his early life. His father had been a hidden child in Budapest during the Shoah, and his mother was an Israeli whose family had emigrated from Iraq. They had met in England while they were graduate students, he in political sciences and she in French literature. His father was generally unavailable to him, because he isolated himself in his study, refusing to show any feelings about any matter whatsoever. His mother was hysterical in her shrieking and complaining about the coldness, inaccessibility, and general "jerkiness" of all men, except perhaps her own father.

The women in the group seemed to have become like his mother, treating the patient as though he were his own father. They devalued his "interpretative" offerings with disdain and contempt, claiming that they had little need for this kind of intellectuality, which left them feeling "cold in their hearts". I found myself in silent agreement with many of his interpretations, and I would often sit back, allowing him to do the work and take the heat. I was uncomfortable with my collusion in a process that was defensive against my own anxieties. Although I could see that he was trying to give them his very best offerings, and to share with them the benefits of his cerebral phallus, I struggled to stay aware that I had become like his split-off father, allowing him to do my interpretive work. In fact, I had begun to sacrifice him to the maternal furies of the group.

I became aware of this only when one of the women said that she would feel safer if the sociologist left the group, and another woman agreed that his surgical comments and interventions made her feel as though she was one of Dr Mengele's experiments. I said that it was important for all of us both to feel and to think. Emotional catharsis alone would hardly lead to longer term reparation and change. Just as there was thought behind some of the overly emotional outbursts which had come to function as a barrier to thought and thinking, there was also

great feeling behind his interpretive comments, even a request to be heard and appreciated by us. Moreover, was it not the case that men could feel, and women could think, and that we had begun to collude in a repetition of gender stereotypes. If the group excluded and extruded the intellectual male object and sent him into the desert, we would be as lonely for him as he would be for us, and we would be as impoverished and damaged as he would be deprived.

I suggested that it would be a good idea to explore the likelihood that the group had an unconscious fantasy that this central male patient was a part of me, in both body and mind. Was it not likely that by scapegoating the sociologist we were attempting to protect ourselves from the experience of emotional pain that would follow from dissolving the psychic membranes of these encapsulations? Were the women who attacked him so persistently and dramatically not avoiding facing up to their own experiences of having been shunned by their fathers who they felt would have preferred sons or had actually preferred brothers, who were seen as more intellectual and academic? I did not say aloud that this was not only a matter of transference from a paternal figure of authority, but also a matter of a voice of reason becoming an obstacle to a hallucinated and illusionary merger with a group whose members profess to be in total agreement with one another.

At the next session, I said that it seemed to me that we had all colluded with the enactment of various personal, family, group and societal encapsulations of traumatic experience, including me. I suggested that my collusion with these processes had prevented the group from exploring their relations with the “sociologist” and the “psychoanalyst” parts of me. This was not without irony in that many members of the group knew that I had been a sociologist at a famous university, and that I had trained as a psychoanalyst, which was one of the reasons why they had sought therapy with me in the first place. I also suggested that the group seemed to have developed a collective fantasy that my interpretations were criticisms and judgments of particular members of the group, and intended as punishments in order to marginalise them. Attacks on the sociologist may, therefore, have been a way of attacking me with impunity. We wondered if the sociologist invited such reactions to him.

III - An Empirical Illustration of Scapegoating in a Demonstration Group in an Event at a Conference

The following vignette describes how I, as the Leader of a “demo-group” at an Event at a group psychotherapy conference, was scapegoated. It is important to keep in mind the tripartite matrix of this group:

The demo-group focused on their commonalities, ignoring – if not denying – their many differences in interests and values. The group completely ignored me, both in their body language and in their refusal to take up any of my remarks. As the leader/conductor of the group, I tried to understand what was stopping the group from exploring their differences, a task that was closer to the advertised purposes of the Event than it was to the apparent massification of the group. I interpreted that massification was driven by their need to avoid their experience of aggregation following their experience of failed dependency on the organisation and on the Chairman of the Event, and that I was perceived as the obstacle to their massification. The Chairman had not arranged the Event in an efficient way, with the correct number of chairs for both the audience and the demonstration group, and for the sound equipment to be put in place. This had led to a serious delay in getting started, and to the “intrusion” of two hotel technicians who had to attach the electronic equipment to the bodies and clothes of each member of the group. The two technicians were immigrants and “men of colour”. In the post-mortem discussion I had referred ironically to the technicians as “brothers”, attempting to convey several layers of meaning of the term, in the context of the foundation matrix, the dynamic matrix, and the personal matrices of the people involved: ethnic groups were “siblings”; the technicians were so-called “brothers”; and the Chairman of the Event and I were often regarded as “brothers”. In response to my “interpretation” it was loudly and almost violently asserted that not only was I an incomprehensible old-school psychoanalyst, but also an old white male racist whose insensitive remarks had prevented the group from sharing a sense of their own virtue, goodness, values, and belief in racial equality. Led by a Caucasian “sister”, many members of the audience walked out in protest against what they took to be my racially prejudiced scapegoating of the hotel technicians.

I said that although I was sorry if I had inadvertently hurt anyone, the group’s “virtue signalling” reflected the denial of their own prejudices and hostilities towards various “minority” groups, such

as Israelis, Palestinians, people of colour, Jews, immigrants, psychoanalysts, etc, some of whom were represented in the demo-group. I also stressed that in my opinion, these processes reflected the personal matrices of the people involved in the demo-group, some of whom were known to me, and with whom I had personal histories of training experience. It was also necessary for us to explore the constraints of the wider audience, the dynamic matrix of the sponsoring organisation, and those of the foundation matrix of the contextual society. I insisted that the group and the contextual audience were in fact scapegoating me for their own troublesome and unacceptable beliefs and feelings. The demonstration had become an enactment of a play within a play, and it was important for us to explore the meaning of these processes.

Many colleagues later suggested that although I may have been correct, I was naïve in thinking that at the present time a demo group in the context of an audience in New York could work with these ideas (Billow, 2018). However, the organisation continues to address these divisive issues, and to do so with conviction, perhaps as a result of this complex and disturbing event (Counselman, 2019).

PART FOUR: TERRORISM AND TERRORISTS IN THE CONTEXT OF MASSIFICATION 4

The many forms of terrorism and the many kinds of terrorists vary in terms of the content of their belief systems and their socio-economic demography. However, their underlying social and psychological dynamics would seem to be similar – if not actually the same. Thus, although it is essential to contextualise these phenomena (Blackwell, 2020; Power, 2020), terrorism and terrorists can to some extent be studied independently of their social contexts and the political content of their ideologies and programmes (Shadach *et al*, 2017; Geller & Shadach, 2020). For example, terrorists have a valency for taking the roles generated by Incohesion, a vulnerability to the suction power of them, and a sensitivity to the personification of these roles, both as perpetrators and victims, as well as bystanders, especially with respect to the dynamics of fundamentalism and scapegoating.

I - Terrorism and Terrorists: Some Brief Definitions 5

In so far as many of us no longer use “terrorism” and “terrorists”, because these terms make it virtually impossible to discuss the actions to which they refer in an atmosphere of optimal scientific objectivity and political neutrality, it is important

to clarify and specify how I will use these terms.

1. The word “terrorism” is derived from the Latin word *terrere* which means to induce “terror, persecution and dread” (Meltzer, 1968). Before the late eighteenth-century, “the word ‘terror’ had largely positive connotations[...], for example, [...] Catholic preachers and theologians [...] spoke of God justly striking terror into the wicked [...], (and)[...] the Old Testament speaks of God delivering the Israelites from Egypt [...] with great terror” (Schechter, 2018). In a more secular context, state terrorism “from above” should be distinguished from “popular” terrorism “from below”. Although terrorism from below has been defined as “the intentional use of violence by non-state organisations, executed against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims” (Ganor, 2002), such actions can also be directed against military and government targets. Both state terrorism from above and popular terrorism from below can emanate from those who are on the political right or the political left, the former seeking to uphold their view of the established order, and the latter to change it. It is also important to distinguish conscious intention from unconscious intention: consciously, a terrorist attack is likely to be a communicational gesture primarily with a political agenda; unconsciously a terrorist attack is likely to be a communicational gesture primarily with a more personal agenda; but in practice terrorist attacks are likely to be governed by both sets of motives and beliefs.

2. A “terrorist” is one who commits or engages in acts of terrorism. However, “terrorist” is often used indiscriminately as a synonym for a violent criminal who is mentally ill, a rebel, a revolutionary, an insurgent, or a freedom fighter, depending on their socio-cultural-political contexts. The label depends on the point of view of who takes editorial responsibility for the narrative. Nonetheless, in essence, a “terrorist” is a person who consciously intends his or her violent actions to strike terror into the hearts and minds of those who are attacked and who witness such attacks in the service of reaching particular goals which are believed to be unreachable through any other means.

3. Although acts of terrorism can be committed by a so-called “lone terrorist”, they are usually committed by a grouping of terrorists either directly or in support of a terrorist who only seems to be acting alone. “Lone terrorists” are often participants in extensive socio-political networks, some of which are internet based. For example, referring to the Norway terrorist attack in 2011, Anders Breivik was first thought to be a “lone terrorist”, but research has shown that he was not really so “alone” as he was profoundly lonely” (Island, 2019).

4. Although the number of potential terrorist groupings and terrorists might be “large”, their actual number is “small”. This might reflect the efforts that take place behind the scenes to curtail the development of terrorist groupings and its ultimate expression in terrorist attacks. Moreover, the number of attacks might be the proverbial tip of an iceberg of people and their groupings who are profoundly angry and alienated from the Establishment of the wider society and its beliefs and values.

5. It is always important to locate terrorism and terrorists within their social and political context, and to consider the ideology of the narrative and the point of view of the narrator. In the context of nation states, so-called “terrorists” have often become so-called “leaders”, e.g. Washington, Begin, and Mandela. Although the obverse process is less well known, there are many instances of leaders becoming terrorists, e.g. Bin Laden.

II - Some Aspects of the Personal Matrices of Terrorists

In the fields of psychoanalysis and group analysis in particular, the authors of virtually all publications concerning terrorism and terrorists acknowledge that although they have clinical and empirical data, they are not permitted for reasons of confidentiality to go into any detail in their attempts to illustrate their basic arguments and generalisations. They are obliged to disguise their data, and sometimes to present this in terms of what sociologists call an “ideal-type”. I, too, cannot avoid these restrictions. However, my (Hopper, 1991, 1995) own clinical experience in London and elsewhere is virtually identical to that reported by Volkan and his colleagues, and by, for example, Biran (2015), Smith (2019), and Peterson & Densley (2019), among many others.

1. Trauma in infancy and childhood

The data from the study of terrorists in virtually all socio-political contexts suggest that although most of them are not “mentally ill” in the narrow psychiatric sense of the term, they have been deeply traumatized (Volkan, 1988). They have suffered chronic physical abuse and profound emotional humiliation, and have witnessed domestic violence, especially as perpetrated by violent and often alcoholic fathers against their mothers who tended to collude with this. They have been denigrated and denuded of the essential elements of positive self-esteem. The “safety feeling” that is necessary for healthy psychic growth (Sandler, 1987) has been violated. Some terrorists have been pushed over the edge by new personal traumas, such as the loss of a job, a death in the family, a divorce, etc. However, the fusional nature of their involvement with their families, close friendship group, and/or wider ethnic group is such that an insult

to the group is likely to be experienced as yet another injustice and insult to their personal honour, and vice-versa (Akhtar, 1999).

Driven by traumatophilia, terrorists feel compelled to repeat their own experiences of having been terrorised and victimised. In addition to their need to evacuate, control, and sadistically hurt their objects, they feel compelled to communicate through sub-symbolic enactments of what seems to them to be ineffable and uncommunicable in ordinary language, partly because they believe that there is no one of significance to them who is prepared to listen and is able to understand what they have experienced and what they have felt and still feel. Thus, despite their own vulnerabilities, terrorists are capable of committing acts of violence which lead to the death and destruction of those who they target, those who are bystanders and witnesses of this, and their own (Kapoor, 2015).

2. Oedipal configurations

Terrorists adopt strategies and manoeuvres of retaliation and revenge towards those objects who they perceive to be responsible for their contemporary exclusion from social life, who are confused with those who they perceive to have excluded them originally. Many terrorists have had experiences with their fathers that can be described as what Schreiber called “soul murder” (Shengold, 1979), involving fear, shame, and very often violence. However, many have had fathers that were aloof and detached from their families and children, such as Bin Laden, Hussein and Milosovic (Stout, 2004). They are likely both to have identified with their aggressors, and to have been driven by fantasies of retaliation and revenge against them. Some terrorists report that they have found psychological security in the belief that following their anticipated suicide operations, they will receive future rewards in abundance, both in paradise and in the collective memory of their families. These beliefs, based on fantasies of sacrifice and of Oedipal triumph, are not confined to Muslim terrorists.

3. Pre-Oedipal configurations

Although some terrorists have had mothers who were ineffectual and unable to protect them against paternal abuse, others have had mothers who were clinging and overprotective. The absence of figures of benign male authority, as opposed to figures of either brutal or cold and detached male power, enable fantasies of merger with mother and her body. Many associations and connections can be made among the body of a terrorist, the body of a mother of a terrorist, the “body” of the father of a terrorist, the body of a family of a terrorist, the “body” of their society, and so on.

It is difficult to know if the aggression of a terrorist attack is directed primarily towards the maternal object, the paternal object, and/or towards both, partly because gender and sex identifications and choices are confused and ambiguous despite pseudo-masculine and pseudo-feminine performances to the contrary. Attacks on collective maternal objects serve both to distance the child from his internal mother and simultaneously to bring them closer together, as seen in the ultimate confusion of the body parts of the suicide bomber with those of his victims.

The internal container of a terrorist is extremely weak. This facilitates the explosive projection of beta-elements, and, at the same time, somewhat ironically, the search for an external container who or which can be strong enough to withstand the explosion.

In this context, it is worth taking note of the connections throughout the world between terrorism and gangs of various kind, criminal activities, and drug addiction. These connections are associated not only with large amounts of liquid currency, which can actually be problematic, but also with various social and psychological factors which underpin them. The social structures of gangs are similar to those of terrorist cells. They are “led” by a charismatic and powerful older man, and the gang itself offers at least the illusion of “total” maternal protection from the exigencies of life on the streets. Historically, some forms of terrorism were associated with the murder of leaders of political and religious institutions by so-called “assassins” who were high on hashish (Hopper, 2003b).

Terrorists report that they feel that they have been the objects of fatal purification, shifted towards the margins of the society, as though they were infected and a source of infection, and as though they were traumatic introjects of some sort who must be extruded. In fact, terrorists feel that they have been scapegoated all their lives.

As the victims of scapegoating in their contextual societies, terrorists then become the perpetrators of it. They terrorise those by whom they feel they have been excluded and marginalised. Terrorists seek to obliterate obstacles to their own sense of goodness and purity. However, the delusional sense of their own goodness and perfection functions as a defence against the delusional sense of their own badness and imperfection, which is partly associated with feeling that they have been excluded from the wider society, which is defensively defined as evil, weak, and corrupt.

Feeling that they have been made tokens of sacrifice, terrorists seek tokens for sacrifice. They perform the rituals of religious sacrifices associated with the liminality of the boundaries between good and evil, and between life and death. This involves finding a balance between expressing the love of their own group and expressing the hatred of the objects who threaten the well-being and the survival of their own group.

Terrorists struggle to find the boundaries between attacks on the “other” and attacks on the “self”, that is, between murder and suicide, which involves finding an acceptable balance between loving and hating. This is especially acute in cases of murder followed by suicide, which terrorism often involves.

2. Terrorists are able to annihilate the targets of their hatred following a process of disassociation in which certain people and their groupings are defined as “inhuman” pseudo-species. This process of pseudo-speciation permits us to do whatever we desire to people and their groups who are defined not only as “others”, but also as members of another species or of an especially created one (Hopper, 2003c; Volkan & Ast, 1997; Erikson, 1968).

This is based in part on the dynamics of sibling rivalry and the dynamics of regressed anality. This can be seen in the themes that typify the denigration by older siblings of younger siblings: poor personal hygiene, inability to speak clearly and properly, ambiguous sexual and gender identities, and so on. These processes can be seen in the way that unconsciously older siblings associate their younger siblings with a variety of cute and cuddly small animals, such as squirrels and rabbits, on the one hand, and with a variety of dirty and smelly vermin such as rats, and stinging insects such as wasps, on the other. Both categories must be controlled, but the latter category must be eliminated, often sadistically, for example, as seen in the ways that children burn ants. It is fantasized that tormenting siblings of whom one is jealous and envious is likely to devastate those who are perceived to have corruptly brought them into being in the first place, i.e. their parents.

With respect to terrorism, this translates into taking revenge on the parental Establishment of the contextual society, who is perceived to have failed to control immigration and/or to have given immigrants excessive financial care, to have failed to uphold “law and order”, to have rewarded “sin” and to have been indifferent towards “virtue”. After all, from the point of view of the terrorist and his groupings, the terrorist is always virtuous, and his victims are always sinful.

From the point of view of the Establishment, the members of terrorist networks are experienced and defined, virtually by definition, as threats to the welfare of the citizenry of the contextual society, who feel compelled to eliminate and to neutralise the activities of terrorists through either death or incarceration. This supports turning a blind eye towards the aggregation that has given rise to the massification of the traumatised society.

IV - Hope and Communication ⁶

Aggregation always breeds discontent and despair, and terrorism is always an expression of the loss of hope. Noting that in English hope is defined in terms of “desirous expectation”, Rycroft (1979) argued that in the beginning of life hope is directed towards the breast and its contents; as the poet said, “Hope springs eternal in the human breast”. Building on Rycroft’s axiom, I (Hopper, 1981, 2003a, 2014) have argued that from conception onwards desirous expectation towards objects that have been valued as “goals” is rooted in relationships embedded within economic, political and religious institutions. Moreover, there are many kinds of desirous expectation, for example, normative expectations, aspirational expectations, anticipatory expectations, and so on. Feelings of relative deprivation are a function of a negative discrepancy between levels of normative expectation and levels of achievement with respect to objects that have been valued as goals. In order to cope with these painful feelings of relative deprivation, people are likely to engage in a variety of forms of instrumental adjustment. One form of instrumental adjustment involves the ability and willingness to change the situation which has given rise to the anxieties in question. However, such changes are often extremely difficult to achieve, especially when people are blocked from full access to political institutions, and/or when such institutions are felt to be systemically biased against them, in which case they are likely to engage in other forms of instrumental adjustment, such as retreatism and ritualism.

Some people are likely to adopt forms of instrumental adjustment that involve action ranging from criminality to rebellion. From the point of view of

the Establishment such action is “illegitimate”. However, from the point of view of the terrorist and his groupings, such action is entirely necessary, primarily because they feel that this is the only way in which they will be heard.

Foulkes (Foulkes & Anthony, 1957) suggested that an antisocial act is often a way of trying to convey a crucial message: if the message is heard and acknowledged, it becomes a communication; but if the message is unheard, it becomes an autistic symptom which in turn is likely to be enacted. In the context of failed communication and therefore failed dependency, terrorism is a proclamation that the fears associated with impeding psychic death are no greater than those associated with actual death, murder and suicide. Although terrorism is violent and destructive and tends to hurt the “innocent” more than it hurts the “guilty”, most of whom are as helpless as the terrorists in their efforts to shape and control their lives, the terrorist act is a cry that the flames of desirous expectation will soon be extinguished. Can terrorism be understood as a final effort to keep hope alive?

It is not only difficult but also impossible to “conclude” an article such as this. I am happy, therefore, to leave it open-ended. Obviously there is much still to be understood about the theory and concept of the tripartite matrix, the basic assumption of Incohesion, scapegoating, and terrorism and terrorists. It is especially important to understand that whereas massification generates scapegoating and terrorism, aggregation generates massification, and social trauma of various kinds are the sources of aggregation. Although the effects of stress, cumulative, and catastrophic social trauma can be ameliorated, they can hardly be eliminated. Moreover, many phenomena that are helpful and beneficial for the society as-a-whole, are also socially traumatic. For example, although the democratization of education is likely to raise normative expectations for economic and status rewards, such rewards are rarely available to all whose normative expectations have been raised. Thus, in the broadest and deepest sense, terrorism is always a political process. It is ironic that even other species can be used as scapegoats for people and groupings who are closer to home.

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(ENDNOTES)

1 Part One draws on Hopper 2018a, 2018b, and on Nitzgen & Hopper, 2017, each of which has extensive bibliography.

2 Part Two draws on Hopper 2019a and 2019d, each of which contains extensive bibliography.

3 Part Three draws on Hopper 2019a, 2019c, 2019d and on McCoy 2012, each of which contains extensive bibliography.

4 Part Four draws on Hopper 2003b, 2019c, 2019d, 2019e, each of which contains extensive bibliography. Although the literature about terrorism and terrorists resists summary, see Yakeley (2017) for a recent collection of articles in the context of psychoanalysis and group analysis. See also: Richardson (2006), Smelser (2007), and Post (2007). Volkan has recently summarised and refined some of his ideas in Suistola & Volkan (2017), which acknowledges the importance of sociological studies, especially those of activism and radicalisation, and contains many references to Volkan's previous work. Akhtar (2017) and Richards (2018) take what Frosh (2008) has called a "trans-disciplinary perspective". The work of Roth (2018) is particularly suggestive.

5 This section draws on Kleinot, 2017.

6 This section draws on Hopper 2003a, 2014 and 2019b.